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LAWRENCE GOODWYN AND 
NEBRASKA POPULISM: 
A REVIEW ESSAY 
ROBERT W. CHERNY 
Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in 
America. By Lawrence Goodwyn. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Illus-
trations, "notes, bibliography, appendices, 
index. xxvii + 718 pp. $22.50. 
Lawrence Goodwyn's book Democratic Prom-
ise is an important contribution to our under-
standing of the nature of Populism. Reviewers 
have termed it "brilliant" and "comprehensive" 
and "the new standard against which all future 
efforts must be measured. ,,1 Goodwyn does, 
indeed, provide the reader with insights into 
the nature of Populism that are available no-
where else. Unfortunately, his work also has 
serious flaws, most obviously in his handling 
of the Populist movement in Nebraska but 
ultimately pervading the entire book. The 
Robert W. Cherny is a professor of history at 
San Francisco State University. A native of 
Beatrice, Nebraska, Cherny received his doc-
torate from Columbia University in 1972. He 
is the author of Populism, Progressivism, and 
the Transformation of Nebraska Politics, 1885-
1915 (1981). 
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student of Populism must be aware of the flaws 
but ought not dismiss the work as a whole, for 
its contributions are important. 
The most important contribution Goodwyn 
makes is to be found in his thorough and 
sympathetic development of the origins of 
Texas Populism. He portrays Texas Populism 
as the political manifestation of an "Alliance 
culture" born during the mid- and late 1880s 
as farmers in a few Texas counties began to 
organize Alliances and, through the Alliances, 
to establish producers' and consumers' coop-
eratives. This cooperative experience, with 
its occasional successes and more general 
failures, radicalized the participants and pro-
duced an "Alliance culture" as shared ex-
periences became shared understandings, expec-
tations, and values. Ultimately the Texas 
Alliance organized or merged with similar 
organizations throughout the South and then 
moved northward, finally reaching forty-three 
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states and territories and some two million farm 
families. 2 
Goodwyn argues that the expansion of the 
concept of cooperation, carried out by organ-
izers sent from Texas, laid the basis for politi-
cal Populism, for "the cooperative movement 
led to political education in terms of farmer-
merchant, farmer-creditor, and farmer-shipper 
relations and ... such education led to the ... 
energizing self-perception of the farmer's subor-
dinate place in the industrial society." Good-
wyn stresses that "only the cooperative ex-
perience over a period of time provided the 
kind of education that imparted to the poli-
tical movement the specific form and substance 
of the greenback heritage.,,3 When the new 
party met in 1892 to nominate national candi-
dates, however, it already had symptoms of an 
internal split, derived according to Goodwyn 
from two very different varieties of third-
party activity. One variety proceeded from the 
Alliance counterculture and produced a Popu-
lism that Goodwyn clearly sees as "genuine." 
By 1892, however, there also existed what 
Goodwyn describes as a "sh~dow movement," 
created in imitation of the counterculture but 
without its cooperative experience and hence 
without its values. The "shadow movement" 
had its base in Nebraska where, Goodwyn 
argues, the party was "virtually issueless," 
subscribed to no "clearly defined Populist 
doctrines," and "represented little more than a 
quest for honorable men who would pledge 
themselves to forsake corrupt practices." The 
1896 presidential nominating convention be-
came the scene of the final showdown between 
these two factions, and the nomination of 
William Jennings Bryan, representing the ascen-
dancy of the "shadow movement," marked the 
death of genuine Populism. 4 
Having presented Bryan and his supporters 
as "trimmers," as issueless, as motivated largely 
by the desire to win office, and as the pre-
cursors of twentieth-century liberalism, Good-
wyn then reverses field and argues that, in 
1896, "the true issues at stake went far beyond 
questions of currency volume, to a contest 
over the underlying cultural values and symbols 
William Jennings Bryan during his 1896 presi-
dential campaign. Courtesy of the Nebraska 
State Historical Society. 
that would govern political dialogue in the 
years to come."S The two central concepts 
defining political debate in 1896 were those 
of "the progressive society" as represented by 
McKinley and "the people," typified by Bryan. 
McKinley's victory was the victory of business, 
of "the most self-consciously exclusive party 
the nation had ever experienced," of "white, 
Protestant, · and Yankee" America, of progress 
and industrial expansion. Goodwyn laments, 
therefore, that "the collapse of Populism meant 
that the values of the corporate state were 
politically unassailable in twentieth-century 
America," and he returns thereby to his open-
ing line: "This book is about the decline of 
freedom in America. ,,6 
Given the major role assigned to Nebraska 
Populism as the center of the "shadow move-
ment" and as ultimately responsible for the 
triumph of shadow over substance, we must 
look care full y at Goodwyn's description of 
the Nebraska movement. Goodwyn presents 
the "National Farmers Alliance" (usually 
known as the Northern Alliance) as largely a 
device to promote newspaper subscriptions 
and never as a base to develop cooperatives. 
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As a result there were but few cooperatives 
formed in Nebraska, few farmers were radical-
ized, and the Nebraska Alliance never moved 
beyond the desire "to elect good men to public 
office." Goodwyn sees three forces as pushing 
the state Alliance into independent political 
action: the Custer County Alliance (based, 
Goodwyn says, upon a cooperative experi-
ence and hence genuinely radicalized), coop-
erative influences from other states, and pres-
sures from charles H. Van Wyck's group of 
antimonopolists within the state Republican 
party. Lacking the radicalizing influence of a 
cooperative experience over a period of time, 
the Nebraska movement was, according to 
Goodwyn, "organizationally shallow and ideo-
logically fragile, . . . a fragile shadow move-
ment unrelated to the doctrines of Populism." 
He claims, "Populism cannot be said to have ex-
isted there at all," for the Nebraska party had 
"no institutional base, no collective identity and 
no movement culture ... no mechanisms for 
self-education, no real lecturing system, no 
methods for developing individual self-respect 
among impoverished people." At base, the 
"farmer movement in Nebraska had no pur-
pose. It only appeared to have one, because of 
its external resemblance to the real movement 
which did." By 1892, Goodwyn argues, the 
Nebraska party was little more than "a loosely 
floating faction of the familiar low-tariff 
Democratic Party, ... little more than a quest 
for honorable men who would pledge them-
selves to forsake corrupt practices." 7 
The starting point for a critique of Good-
wyn's treatment of Nebraska Populism must be 
an enumeration of errors. The following state-
ment on pages 316-17 is completely erroneous: 
In the fall of 1892 the shadow movement 
of Populism in Nebraska immersed itself 
in Democratic fusion-and on Democratic 
terms. The fusionists re-elected Omar 
[sic J Kem and William Jennings Bryan, 
giving each party a man of its choice, and 
supported a third "straight-out" fusionist 
who won. The Republicans swept the 
state offices from the governorship on 
down and won the other three congres-
sional seats and the state's electoral votes 
for Harrison. The ideological disarray in 
these proceedings caused surprisingly few 
internal tremors-a clear indication that the 
third party in Nebraska, having failed to 
generate a culture of reform, possessed few 
reform principles it considered important 
enough to defend. 8 
There was no state-level fusion in 1892, 
and limited fusion at a local level. William 
Jennings Bryan did not run as a fusionist in 
1892 and he was opposed by both Populist 
and Republican candidates. Omer Kem did 
not run as a fusionist in 1892; he was opposed 
by both Democratic and Republican candi-
dates. All three major parties-Populists, Demo-
crats, and Republicans-had full slates in the 
field, contesting every statewide office. The 
only statewide attempt at fusion that year 
consisted of efforts by several prominent 
Democrats to swing Democratic voters in sup-
port of the Populist presidential candidate in 
order to deny the state's electoral votes to the 
Republicans. There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that, in 1892, Nebraska Populism 
"immersed itself in Democratic fusion." On the 
contrary, efforts toward fusion at a presidential 
level and-more extensively-in legislative dis-
tricts were initiated by and almost entirely 
limited to Democrats. If any group in Nebraska 
"immersed itself in fusion," it was the Demo-
crats, and they did so on Populist terms. 9 
The following statement on pages 290-91 
is incorrect: 
The Omaha World-Herald was purchased 
in 1894 and young pro-silver Congress-
man Williams [sic J Jennings Bryan in-
stalled as its editor. The silver men put 
in their own management, leaving Bryan 
free to campaign for silver while contrib-
uting an editorial or two each week. 
This charge is repeated, with a 'variation in the 
date, on page 399: 
It was at this point in his career [when 
the results of the 1894 legislative elec-
tions became known J that Bryan's friends 
among the silver magnates purchased the 
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Omaha World-Herald, which, with Bryan 
as its editor, promptly became an even 
more active advocate of free silver. 
The only citation for the former statement is 
to Richard Hofstadter's American Political 
Tradition, and there is no citation for the 
latter. Hofstadter does not specifically cite a 
source for his statement, which reads as fol-
lows: "he turned to an ill-paid position as 
editor of the Omaha World-Herald, which had 
been procured by his patrons among the silver 
interests." A complete and detailed account 
of the financial transactions surrounding 
Bryan's position at the World-Herald was pub-
lished in 1968; in it, Paul V. Peterson makes 
clear that Bryan became "editor-in-chief," a 
symbolic position providing little income and 
requiring only a weekly column, after the pur-
chase of stock totaling less than $10,000 by 
Bryan (who personally bought one-quarter of 
the total) and five other Nebraskans, all close 
political allies of Bryan. No money was raised 
from the silver interests. Ownership and con-
trol of the paper remained where it had been 
before, with Gilbert M. Hitchcock. Goodwyn 
also has problems with chronology, suggesting 
that Bryan became editor only after it became 
clear that he could not be elected to the Senate 
by the 1895 legislature (and exactly following 
Hofstadter in this error). Bryan began his 
editorial work on September 1, 1894, more 
than two months before the election, and as a 
part of his campaign for the Senate seat. 10 
The following statement from page 397 is 
totally in error: 
In an atmosphere of moderate Populist-
Democratic-Republican conviviality, undis-
turbed by references to the greenback 
doctrines of the Omaha Platform, the 
1893 coalition of three-party fusionists 
selected as its judicial candidate a nominal 
Populist and political moderate named 
Silas A. Holcomb. 
There was no such "three-party" fusion, nor 
was there fusion at all in 1893; each party 
nominated a full slate of candidates for all 
statewide offices. The platform adopted by the 
Populist convention began with a statement 
endorsing and reaffirming the Omaha platform. 
The only major crossing of party lines in 1893 
occurred when the Republican convention 
refused to renominate long-time Supreme 
Court Judge Samuel Maxwell and chose in his 
stead an alleged railroad sympathizer, an action 
that drove both Maxwell and Edward Rose-
water, editor of the Omaha Bee and nominally 
a Republican but one with a well-established 
penchant for bolting his party, to endorse 
Holcomb. No other state-level "fusion" took 
place.ll 
Goodwyn's account of the 1894 state fusion 
is filled with suggestions that are without basis 
in fact. For example, he has the World-Herald 
endorsing the concept of fusion in 1894 and 
thus finally breaking away from the wing of the 
state party led by J. Sterling Morton. However, 
any student of Nebraska political history is 
aware that the World-Herald and its predeces-
sor the Herald had opposed Morton's leader-
ship within the party for more than a decade 
before 1894, and that, specifically, the paper 
had advocated some form of fusion in both 
1890 and 1891. For another example, Good-
wyn describes the Populists as "willing" to join 
Bryan in a fusion effort in 1894 when in fact 
the Populist convention had no say whatever 
in the matter. The fusion of 1894 occurred 
because a majority of the Democratic state 
convention supported, as their candidate for 
the Democratic nomination for governor, the 
person who had already been nominated by the 
Populist state convention some time before. 
The Populists had no opportunity to accept or 
reject this fusion; it was forced upon them by 
the unilateral action of the Democratic state 
convention. Fusion in 1894 was only partial, 
with the Democratic state convention taking 
as their own candidates some of the Populist 
candidates and making separate nominations 
for other offices in the hope that the Popu-
list state committee would withdraw their 
candidates for those positions. When this 
opportunity to participate in fusion pre-
sented itself, the Populist state committee 
rejected it. There was no "top-to-bottom" 
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fusion as Goodwyn implies in the text but 
corrects in a footnote. 12 
This list of examples of errors in the treat-
ment of Nebraska Populism might be consider-
ably lengthened, especially if small errors of 
fact or spelling were added. To cite only one 
persistent example, the person elected to 
Congress from the Third District in 1890 and 
reelected from the Sixth District in 1892 and 
1894 was neither "Omar Ken" nor "Omar 
Kern," but Orner Kern. The repeated misspell-
ing of Kern's name, however, is less surprising 
when one realizes that Goodwyn neither cited 
nor, apparently, consulted either the sole schol-
arly biography of Kern or Kern's memoirs. Such 
a failure is puzzling, given the major role Good-
wyn assigns to Kern as the leading representa-
tive of one of the three major forces impelling 
forma tion of a third party in 1890. 13 
Goodwyn's sources for his novel interpreta-
tion of Nebraska politics are surprisingly sparse, 
consisting primarily of the dissertations of John 
D. Barnhart (Harvard, 1927) and of Annabel 
L. Beal (University of Nebraska, 1965); Douglas 
Bakken's published version of Luna E. Kellie's 
memoirs; the (Lincoln) Farmers' Alliance 
from 1889 through 1892; the Omaha World-
Herald for 1894; the manuscript collections of 
William V. Allen, William Jennings Bryan, and 
the Nebraska Alliance; various articles by Paolo 
Coletta; plus scattered references to a few other 
articles, books, and newspapers. There is no cita-
tion to such standard references as the narra-
tive histories by A. E. Sheldon or Albert 
Watkins, nor to the important Nebraska History 
articles by Frederick C. Luebke (1969), David 
S. Trask (1970, 1975), Paul V. Peterson (1968), 
and Samuel E. Walker (1974), nor to James 
Olson's biography of J. Sterling Morton, nor 
to Luebke's work on German political behavior, 
nor to the theses of Clifford E. Bowman on the 
populist press, DeLloyd Guth on Kern, Dale J. 
Hart on Rosewater, or Samuel E. Walker on 
the state newspaper of the Populist party, nor 
to the dissertation of David S. Trask, nor to 
the manuscript collections of Jefferson H. 
Broady, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Samuel Maxwell, 
or J. Sterling Morton, nor to the memoirs of 
Mary Louise Jeffrey, John H. Powers, Arthur 
F. Mullen, or George Norris. 14 Given the great 
importance Goodwyn attaches to the Nebraska 
"shadow movement" as the antipode of "gen-
uine" Populism, one might have expected a 
more thorough examination of such basic 
sources and histories. 
Equally distressing is Goodwyn's tendency 
to reconstruct the Nebraska variety of Populism 
with reference not to the way it was, but in-
stead with reference-implicit or explicit-to 
the way it "should" have been, given conclu-
sions already drawn from the Texas experience. 
The section from page 317, quoted above, is 
direc tl y relevant: 
In the fall of 1892 the shadow movement 
of populism in Nebraska immersed itself 
in Democratic fusion-and· on Democratic 
terms. A modicum of success resulted. 
The fusionists re-elected Omar [sic 1 Kern 
and William Jennings Bryan to Congress, 
giving each party a man of its choice, and 
supported a third "straight-out" fusionist 
who won. 
As already noted, this statement of events 
is completely erroneous. What sources did 
Goodwyn consult in developing this peculiar 
narrative? The citation for that paragraph 
is revealing. It includes reference to John 
D. Barnhart's dissertation, pages 325 and 
326, to Horace Merrill's Bourbon Democracy 
of the Middle West, pages 222-25, and to 
Paolo E. Coletta's Nebraska History article 
on Bryan's second congressional campaign. The 
footnote then concludes with the cryptic 
comment: "Some inferences have been drawn 
that were not explicit in these sources." In 
point of fact, the entire description of the 
1892 campaign must have been inferred be-
cause the misstatements of fact are "not 
explicit in these sources.,,15 What could have 
caused Goodwyn to make such erroneous 
inferences? Apparently he was misled by his 
exposition of the Texas experience to the 
point where he became convinced that gen-
uine Populism could only result from a coop-
erative experience. Goodwyn reveals the 
extent to which the Texas experience dictates 
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his analysis of Nebraska Populism in another 
footnote: 
For reasons that are self-describing, the 
only regions of Nebraska producing a 
political movement genuinely resembling 
Populism were the handful of counties-
none too far from Custer County-which 
had generated at least the beginnings of 
a cooperative movement. Frot:l1 such coun-
ties came authentic greenbackers, such 
as Mrs. Luna Kellie, a tireless reform editor, 
and-a sure sign of the culture of Popu-
lism-movement songs. See Douglas A. 
Baaken [sic 1, "Luna Kellie and the Farm-
ers [sic I Alliance," Nebraska History (Sum-
mer 1969). 
In fact, Bakken's edited version of Kellie's 
memoirs contains virtually no references to the 
period before she became an Alliance state 
officer in 1894 and no discussion of cooper-
ative activities before that time. Apparently 
Goodwyn is again drawing inferences based 
on his analysis of Texas rather than on the 
sources or material cited for Nebraska. 16 
A similar process may be seen in Goodwyn's 
treatment of Orner Madison Kern. Even though 
Goodwyn never does spell Kern's name correct-
ly, he attributes to him great importance in the 
development of what semblance of "genuine" 
Populism was to be found in Nebraska. Good-
wyn concentrates on the organization of a 
cooperative store at Westerville, Custer County, 
in July of 1889, and although neither Beal's 
dissertation on Custer County Populism nor 
any other cited source indicates the following, 
Goodwyn pronounces: 
As it had elsewhere, the movement toward 
cooperative buying and selling generated 
outright hostility from Custer County 
merchants, causing Alliancemen under the 
leadership of a relatively unknown but 
articulate farmer named Omar [sic I Kern 
to put a county ticket in the field for 
the fall elections. They followed this move 
by holding primaries and selecting nomi-
nees for county offices .... In November, 
the Custer independent ticket swept the 
field, all but one of its candidates being 
elected. 
Kern, it should be noted, had been the Union 
Labor candidate for state senator in 1888 and 
had accepted that party's nomination for uni-
versity regent three weeks before the formation 
of the cooperative store. His commitment to 
"a special interest party ... dedicated solely 
to the farmer" predated the cooperative en-
deavor, and a full year before the founding of 
the store Kern had come to view the Alliance 
as a potential vehicle for such a special-interest 
party. Kern did not participate in the formation 
of the cooperative store. There is no evidence 
of "outright hostility from Custer County 
merchants"; indeed, there are suggestions to the 
contrary in Beal's dissertation. There is no evi-
dence in any source of a cause-and-effect rela-
tionship between the formation of the Wester-
ville store and the naming of an Alliance ticket 
in the fall election. The fact that both Kern and 
the Westerville cooperative store were to be 
found within the geographic confines of Custer 
County leads Goodwyn, fifty pages later, to 
refer to "such cooperative advocates as Omar 
Ken [sic I ," despite the absence of any evi-
dence of Kern's advocating cooperatives, either 
in the materials cited by Goodwyn or in mate-
rials not cited.17 
Because Goodwin credits the cooperative 
experience, over time, as the "animating es-
sence" of Populism, and because he is so 
insistent that cooperative ventures were virtual-
ly nonexistent in Nebraska, it is of interest to 
list only those ventures to be found in either 
Barnhart's dissertation or in Stanley Parson's 
The Populist Context, both sources cited by 
Goodwyn: 
1887-Founding of Farmers' Mutual Insur-
ance Company, Richardson County 
1888-Founding . of Thayer County Fire 
Insurance Company 
January-March 1889-Alliance state execu-
tive committee unsuccessfully seeks mod-
ification of state law to allow statewide 
mutual insurance companies 
March 1889-An Alliance member calls for 
establishment of an Alliance coopera-
tive store in Hayes County 
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Orner Madison Kern and his family outside their sod house in 1886. Kern was the Union 
Labor party candidate for state senate two years later and for university regent in 1889. 
He was elected to Congress in 1890 in a campaign in which he stressed his mortgaged sod 
house homestead. He was reelected in 1892 and 1894. Courtesy of the Solomon D. Butcher 
Collection, Nebraska State Historical Society. 
July 1889-Formation of the Custer County 
Farmers' Alliance Purchasing and Selling 
Company, with a store at Westerville 
Summer 1889-Effort to construct a cooper-
ative grain elevator by Elmwood Farmers' 
Alliance 
August 1889-Formation of Cambridge 
Farmers' Business Association, a pro-
ducers' and consumers' cooperative that 
had constructed a stockyards and grain 
elevator by November 
September 1889-Report on a cooperative 
grain-selling operation and on construc-
tion of a cooperative elevator by the 
Farmers' Warehouse Company, Arapahoe 
October 1889-Formation of a business 
association by the York County Alliance 
and reports on cooperative purchasing 
of salt and flour 
December 1889-Paxton and Gallagher, 
Omaha wholesale merchants, refuse to sell 
to an Alliance cooperative store in Oak 
December 1889-State Alliance appoints a 
business agent 
Late 1889-Effort to construct a cooper-
ative elevator in Osceola18 
Goodwyn explores none of these at any length, 
except for the Custer County cooperative 
store and except for the misleading footnote 
already described. It must be noted that none 
of the counties involved shares a border with 
Custer County. Custer County, to be sure, 
is a very large county located in almost the 
exact center of the state. Any other Nebras-
ka county will not be "too far" from it. How-
ever, the closest cooperative of those listed 
above is a distance of something over eighty 
miles from Westerville. Instead of assuming, 
as Goodwyn does, that all these other coop-
erative efforts were the result of the influence 
of the Custer County example, it seems more 
reasonable to presume that all of them re-
sulted from the efforts of local Alliancemen 
or of paid state organizers. Both Parsons 
and Barnhart indicate the rapid growth of 
the state Alliance in 1889, and Parsons notes 
explicitly, 
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The Alliance store was a popular remedy 
for the farmers' grievances, and, in nearly 
all of the six counties studied, the farmers 
attempted to use this method to lower 
their costs. Usually the county Alliance 
hired a local businessman or former clerk 
I 19 to manage the store or e evator. 
Although Goodwyn credits the Kansas Alli-
ance with a strong cooperative movement, a 
survey of the standard sources does not indi-
cate any significant difference between the 
record of cooperatives in Nebraska and the 
pattern in Kansas, nor does a more detailed 
comparison suggest significant differences in 
party development, in organizing efforts, in 
the nature of electoral support for the Popu-
list party, or in the nature of leadership. 20 On 
the basis of all the standard sources, there 
seems to be little justification for awarding 
Kansas Populists the mantle of legitimacy and 
de'nying it to those of Nebraska. 
Were Nebraska Populists, as Goodwyn 
charges, "issueless"? Were they solely con-
cerned with the election of honest, decent 
candidates and unconcerned with land, trans-
portation, and financial issues? One approach 
to resolving these questions would be to survey 
platforms drafted by conventions of the state 
Alliance or the state party. The first Nebraska 
Alliance convention platform of record dates 
from 1882; it called for the prohibition of rail-
way rate discrimination, for a railway com-
mission to enforce such laws, for a fiat defini-
tion of currency, for government issue and 
control of the currency and for postal savings 
banks (Le., the germ of a government alterna-
tive banking system), for government owner-
ship of the telegraph and telephone system, for 
the preservation of public lands for actual 
settlers, for the merit system in civil service, 
and against free railway passes. Another early 
platform, that of 1884, repeated these demands 
and added more, including a tariff for revenue 
only, the protection of trade unions, and the 
abolition of convict leasing. Well before issu-
ance of the 1886 Cleburne Demands by the 
Texas Alliance (described by Goodwyn as "the 
first major document of the agrarian revolt"), 
Nebraska Alliancemen had outlined what 
Goodwyn calls "the land, transportation, and 
financial issues that were to become the focus 
of Populist agitation in the 1890's." The Na-
tional Union party of 1886, formed by promi-
nent Alliancemen, nominated state Alliance 
leader Jay Burrows for governor and issued a 
platform calling for fiat money ("money is 
purely a creation of law") to be issued solely 
by the government "in quantity sufficient to 
effect the exchange of our products," for gov-
ernment operation and control of the railroads 
and telegraph systems, against land monopoli-
zation, against convict leasing, for prohibition, 
for woman suffrage, and for state legislation 
establishing maximum railroad rates. In point 
of fact, in 1886 the Nebraska agrarian radicals 
not only adopted a platform far more radical 
than the contemporary Cleburne Demands, 
but they then followed the full logic of this 
platform into independent political action. The 
crushing defeat of the National Union slate 
severely disrupted the state Alliance and no 
state Alliance platforms are to be located until 
1890.21 
In 1890, the new Independent party and 
the state Farmers' Alliance issued platforms 
calling for fiat money (through silver coinage 
and paper issue) to be issued by government 
alone, the abolition of land monopolization, 
government ownership and operation of the 
railroad and telegraph systems, state maximum 
rate laws, the eight-hour day, the Australian 
ballot, and the foreclosure of the Union Pacific 
mortgage by the government. Subsequent 
platforms from 1891 through 1895 repeated 
these key money, land, transportation, and 
labor issues and added nationalization of bank-
ing (first in 1891), a graduated income tax, 
nationalization of coal mines, and direct elec-
tion of the president, vice-president, and 
senators. At a state level, they called for a 
maximum railroad rate law, a usury law, a 
mortgage foreclosure moratorium law, the 
formation of cooperative insurance companies, 
free school textbooks, municipal ownership 
of streetcar, electric, gas, and water systems 
and of coal yards, and opposed "all secret or 
LAWRENCE GOODWYN AND NEBRASKA POPULISM 189 
The congressional nominating convention of 1890 of the Nebraska Third District. This was 
the body of Alliancemen and their allies that nominated Orner M. Kern. Courtesy of the 
Solomon D. Butcher Collection, Nebraska State Historical Society. 
open political organizations based on religious 
prejudices"-a clear attack on the anti-Catholic 
American Protective Association. Of the four 
Alliance platforms issued between 1890 and 
1895, two put a demand for fiat money in first 
place and the other two put it second. Of six 
party platforms issued between 1890 and 1895, 
those of 1890 and 1891 put the demand for 
fiat money first and all the others gave first 
place to an endorsement and reaffirmation of 
the Omaha Platform. 22 
Party platforms were a subject of intense 
concern at Alliance and party conventions, and 
both the drafting of resolutions and ordering 
of planks reflects the concern attached to 
them. By such criteria, Nebraska Populists and 
Alliance were not, as Goodwyn claims, "issue-
less." On the contrary, they were consistently 
in the advance of the agrarian movement and 
were similarly advanced in converting such 
stands into legislation. In 1891, for example, 
the Populist majorities in the legislature pushed 
through an Australian ballot law, relief for 
drought victims, the legalization of mutual 
insurance companies, the repeal of a sugar 
bounty, the eight-hour day, free school text-
books, and-most importantly-the establish-
ment of maximum railroad rates. The last is a 
strong assertion of the power of the state to 
act directly on behalf of the farmers and other 
consumers of railway services. Efforts to 
pass a usury law and a mortgage foreclosure 
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moratorium failed, largely because of the Popu-
lists' inexperience with the legislative process. 
Goodwyn suggests that, in the simultaneous 
session of the Texas legislature, Texas radicals 
"wanted too much" in asking for free school 
textbooks, a usury law, a mechanics' lien law, 
and an elective railroad commission. The Ne-
braskans were both more successful and more 
direct-no railway commission to set rates for 
them, but a direct exercise of the legislative 
power itself. Although the new party got its 
maximum rate bill passed, the bill was vetoed 
(by a Democrat, not-as Goodwyn states-a 
Republican). The 1893 legislature, organized 
by a coalition of Populists and a handful of 
Democrats, passed the railroad rate law again 
and other legislation, including regulation of 
the Omaha stockyards. Both measures were 
ruled invalid, the former in Smyth v. Ames, 
the latter because of a defect in title resulting 
fr~m Populist legislative inexperience. 23 
By any reasonable criteria, Nebraska Popu-
lists were not "issueless." Their issues-land, 
money, and transportation-were stated as early 
as 1882 and there was no retreat from them. 
To such economic issues they added opposition 
to the American Protective Association in 1893 
and after. All of these issues were repeatedly 
stated in platforms, campaigns, and party news-
papers, and were developed into legislative 
proposals. All of these issues grew out of the 
experiences of the 1870s, 1880s, and early 
1890s, from railroad rate discrimination, from 
the widely shared experiences of mortgage debt 
and high interest rates and deflation, from the 
development of large-scale land holdings by 
such noncitizens as William Scully, and from 
repeated encounters with the seeming political 
muscle of railroads, insurance companies, 
money lenders, grain buyers, and others of the 
"commercial classes." The definition of these 
issues did, in fact, result from shared experi-
ences, which were recalled and focused by the 
low corn prices of 1889 and by the apparent 
manipulation of Republican conventions by the 
railroad companies that year. This account, 
familiar to all readers of the histories of Ne-
braska Populism written by John Barnhart, 
John Hicks, Stanley Parsons, and Addison E. 
Sheldon, allows us to understand the radicali-
zation of Nebraska farmers without reference 
to a long-term cooperative experience. His-
torians of Kansas Populism-Raymond Miller, 
Hicks again, Walter Nugent, and Gene Clanton-
have given us a similar picture of that state's 
political development. 
Goodwyn does allow that Nebraska Popu-
lists may have taken stands on issues, and 
he specifically denies that they were "ideo-
logically uninformed." Indeed, he suggests 
that "their truncated movement was too 
exclusively 'ideological':. it concerned only 
policies and 'politics' -expressed essentially 
in the desire to win the next election." Thus, 
when he speaks, as he repeatedly does, of 
Nebraska Populists as "issueless" or having 
no "program," it is clear that he means one 
thing only: the state leadership did not focus 
solely or even primarily on cooperatives as 
the raison d'etre of the organization. As a 
result, "In terms of shared experience and 
shared hope, the twin legacies of the coop-
erative crusade, the farmer movement in 
Nebraska had no purpose." Is this conclusion 
an accurate description of what we know 
about the movement at the grass roots? The 
answer must be negative. It is clear from 
memoirs, local newspapers, and manuscript 
collections that the social and educational 
aspects of the movement, as well as its coop-
erative aspects, were all very similar, whether in 
Kansas, South Dakota, or Nebraska. By all 
accounts, Nebraska Populism had as broad and 
deep a base as did the movement in neighboring 
states. 24 
A survey of the social and emotional nature 
of Alliance radicalism, of Alliance cooperative 
efforts, and of the issues of the Populist party, 
from the mid-1880s through 1895, based upon 
both primary sources and the works of all 
previous historians, fails to Uncover any clear 
dimension along which the Populist parties of 
the Middle Border states can be readily differ-
entiated. A recent study of the extent of 
cooperatives in cleven states (not including 
Nebraska) over the period from 1885 through 
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1891, based on R. G. Dun credit records, con-
cluded that, outside Texas, 
the cooperatives were never a determining 
element in the dynamic stages of the Al-
liance-Populist movement ... rather than 
the cooperative "movement culture" pro-
ducing populism, a good case can be made 
for the exact opposite. 25 
It is clear that the Texas Populists were dltter-
ent, especially in the scope of their coopera-
tive programs and in their last-ditch opposition 
to the nomination of Bryan in 1896. But this 
should not necessarily lead the historian to 
label the one as "genuine" and all others that 
fail to correspond exactly as being without 
substance. 
It is necessary to add a brief comment 
on the nature of Goodwyn's evidence and 
method. With regard to Texas, he seems to 
have explored all available sources and his-
torical analyses with great care. Outside Texas, 
the exploration seems less thorough, and 
local sources (such as newspapers and mem-
oirs) are largely absent. His methodology 
is wholly qualitative, almost antiquantitative, 
and he seems to suggest that efforts to under-
stand Populism through tuantitative analysis 
are doomed to failure. 2 Weakness in the 
handling of statistics in the narrative is also 
reflected in a very weak treatment of voting 
behavior after the Civil War. Goodwyn suggests 
that there were eight "constituencies" after 
the Civil War (Northern farmers, Northern 
workers, Northern men.of commerce, Northern 
Negroes, Southern farmers, Southern workers, 
Southern men of commerce, and Southern 
ex-slaves) and that seven of these eight tended 
to vote "their wartime sympathies," with 
the sole exception being the Northern urban 
workers, whom Goodwyn describes as "largely 
immigrant and overwh elmingly Catholic." He 
also describes the politics of the period from 
the end of the war to the 1890s as "issueless," 
one of his favorite pejorative epithets. This 
survey of political behavior over the period 
from 1865 to 1890 unfortunately ignores 
(except for a footnote) the crucially impor-
tant work of Samuel P. Hays, Richard Jensen, 
Paul Kleppner, Frederick C. Luebke, and 
others who have employed quantitative meth-
odologies and social-science forms of analysis 
to explore the relationships between social 
patterns, voting behavior, and other forms 
of political behavior. 27 These historians have 
given us a picture of Northern politics that 
is Hlled with issues (albeit largely local issues 
of an ethnocultural nature) and in which 
voters behave in a far more rational fash-
ion than that with which Goodwyn credits 
them. 
Although Goodwyn's treatment of Texas 
agrarian radicalism is thorough, well-developed, 
and convincing, his attempt to judge all other 
varieties against the Texas model leads to a 
misunderstanding of the complex nature of 
Populism, both in Nebraska and elsewhere. 
This tendency to judge all other varieties of 
Populism by the Texas model is an example of 
a reductive fallacy, in that a large, complex, 
and multifaceted phenomenon is evaluated by 
a single, simple-even simplistic-criterion, the 
presence or absence of a cooperative move-
ment over time. This reduction prevents the 
development of a treatment of Populism out-
side Texas that is as thorough, well-developed, 
and convincing as the treatment of the Texas 
movement. The degree to which Goodwyn's 
reductive approach discounts the "genuine-
ness" of other radicalizing experiences must 
also be the measure of the degree to which he 
falls short of realizing his two goals. The one 
goal, obviously, is historiographical, a major 
reinterpretation of the nature of Populism. 
The. other goal is clearly political, expressed 
in the quotation with which he introduces the 
book: "The people need to 'see themselves' 
ex perimenting in democratic forms. ,,28 One 
can applaud the goal of increasing popular 
understanding of the past in order to stimulate 
a questioning of contemporary economic, 
social, and political assumptions. The people, 
however, also need to know that past politics 
were often as complex and multifaceted as 
those of the present, and that efforts to reduce 
complex problems to simple paradigms usually 
fail. 
192 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1981 
NOTES 
1. For examples of laudatory reviews, see 
R. A. Rosenstone, Progressive 41 (1977): 
56-57; charles A. Cannon, journal of Southern 
History 43 (1977): 471-72; Henry C. Dethloff, 
Agricultural History 52 (1978): 216-17; 
Robert C. McMath, American Historical Review 
82 (1977): 753-54; and Walter Nugent, journal 
of American History 64 (1977): 464-65. For 
more critical reviews, see Gilbert C. Fite, 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 69 (1978): 137-
78; H. Wayne Morgan, Business History Review 
51 (1977): 242-45; Theodore Saloutos, Pacific 
Historical Review 47 (1978): 149-51; and 
Norman Pollack, Historican 40 (1977): 132-34. 
In this essay, all references are to the full, 
unabridged edition, Democratic Promise: The 
Populist Moment in America, rather than to the 
shorter version published in 1978 under the 
title The Populist Moment: A Short History 
of-the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978). 
2. Democratic Promise, chapters 1-5, with 
quotes from pp. 80, 81. 
3. Ibid., chapters 5-8, esp. pp. 110, 208. 
4. Ibid., chapters 8, 9, 13-15, esp. pp. 312, 
314,388,396,400,427,512-14. 
5. Ibid., p. 522. 
6. Ibid., pp. 537, vii. 
7. Ibid., esp. pp. 178, 181-82, 202, 204, 
207, 209, 210, 388, 400. 
8. Ibid., pp. 316-17. 
9. DeLloyd John Guth, "Orner Madison 
Kern: The People's Congressman" (M.A. thesis, 
Creighton University, 1962), esp. p. 117; 
Annabel L. Beal, "The Populist Party in Custer 
County, Nebraska: Its Role in Local, State, and 
National Politics, 1889-1906" (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Nebraska, 1965), esp. pp. 
57, 62; Paolo E. Coletta, "The Nebraska 
Democratic State Convention of April 13-14, 
1892," Nebraska History 39 (1958): 317-34; 
Coletta, "William Jennings Bryan's Second 
Congressional Campaign," Nebraska History 40 
(1959): 275-92, esp. 287, 290; John D. Barn-
hart, "The History of the Farmers' Alliance and 
of the People's Party in Nebraska" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1930), chapter 
6, esp. pp. 309, 324; Marie U. Harmer and 
James L. Sellers, "Charles H. Van Wyck-Soldier 
and Statesman," Nebraska History 12 (1929): 
3-36, 81-128, 190-246,322-73, esp. 322-73; 
David Stephens Trask, "A Natural Partnership: 
Nebraska's Populists and Democrats," Nebraska 
History 56 (1975): 419-38, esp. 425-28; 
Albert Watkins, Illustrated History of Nebraska 
(Lincoln: Western Publishing and Engraving 
Co., 1913), 3:242-43; A. E. Sheldon, Nebras-
ka: The Land and the People (Chicago: Lewis 
publishing Co., 1931), 1:718-19;James C. Olson, 
j. Sterling Morton (Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, 1942), esp. pp. 340-45; Omaha 
World-Herald, August 4, 5, 31, and September 
3, 1892; James E. Boyd Manuscript Collection, 
Nebraska State Historical Society, box 2; see 
also relevant portions of the William Jennings 
Bryan Manuscript Collection, Library of Con-
gress, and the Jefferson Broady Manuscript 
Collection, Nebraska State Historical Society. 
10. Richard Hofstadter, The American Poli-
tical Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948), p. 196; Paolo E. Coletta, William j en-
nings Bryan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1964), 1:100-1, 104; Paul V. Peterson, 
"William Jennings Bryan: World-Herald Edi-
tor," Nebraska History 49 (1968): 349-72, esp. 
360,367. 
11. John G. W. Lewis, ed., Nebraska Party 
Platforms: 1858-1940 (Lincoln: Works Pro-
jects Administration and University of Nebras-
ka, 1940), pp. 181-84, 186-87; Sheldon, 
Nebraska, 1:734-36; Watkins, History of Ne-
braska, 3:254-55; Olson, j. Sterling Morton, 
pp. 381-83; Coletta, Bryan, 1:87-89; N. C. 
Abbott, "Silas A. Holcomb," Nebraska History 
26 (1945): 187-200, and 27 (1946): 3-17; 
Johannes M. Klotsche, "The Political Career 
of Samuel Maxwell" (M.A. thesis, University 
of Nebraska, 1928); Samuel Maxwell Manu-
script Collection, Nebraska State Historical 
Society, box 5; Barnhart, "Farmers' Alliance," 
p.358. 
12. Democratic Promise, pp. 397-99; Trask, 
"Natural Partnership," esp. pp. 429-31; Klot-
sche, "Samuel Maxwell"; Abbott, "Silas A. 
Holcomb"; Sheldon, Nebraska, 1 :745-53; Wat-
kins, History of Nebraska, 3:256, 259, 698-
99; Coletta, Bryan, 1: 1 00-2; Olson, j. Sterling 
Morton, pp. 384-85; Barnhart, "Farmers' 
Alliance," pp. 362-78; Omaha World-Herald, 
September 27, 1894; Bryan MSS, LC, box 3; 
Omaha Bee, August 16, 24, 30 and October 
20, 22, 1894. 
LAWRENCE GOODWYN AND NEBRASKA POPULISM 193 
13. Democratic Promise, pp. 202-7, 209, 
262; Guth, "Kern"; Orner M. Kern memoirs, 
Claud J. Kern, Cottage Grove, Oregon. 
14. In addition to those sources cited in 
previous notes, see the following: Gilbert M. 
Hitchcock Papers, Library of Congress; Charles 
H. Van Wyck Papers, University of Kansas; 
Mary Louise Jeffrey, "Young Radicals of the 
Nineties," Nebraska History 38 (1957): 25-43; 
Arthur F. Mullen, Western Democrat (New 
York: wilfred Funk, 1940); John H. Powers, 
Autobiography (Trenton, Nebr.: Register, n.d.); 
Frederick C. Luebke, Immigrants and Politics: 
The Germans of Nebraska, 1880-1900 (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969); 
Earl G. Curtis, "John Milton Thayer," Nebras-
ka History 28 (1947): 225-38, and 29 (1948): 
55-68, 134-50; Luebke, "Main Street and 
Countryside: Patterns of Voting in Nebraska 
during the Populist Era," Nebraska History 
50 (1969): 257-76; Paul V. Peterson, "William 
Jennings Bryan, World-Herald Editor," Ne-
braska History 49 (1968): 349-72; David Ste-
phens Trask, "Formation and Failure: The 
Populist Party in Seward County, 1890-
1892," Nebraska History 51 (1970): 281-
302; Samuel Walker, "George Howard Gibson, 
Christian Socialist among the Populists," 
Nebraska History 55 (1974): 553-72; Clifford 
Ernest Bowman, "The Populist Press of Ne-
braska, 1888-1896" (M.A thesis, University 
of Nebraska, 1936); Dale J. Hart, "Edward 
Rosewater and the Omaha Bee in Nebraska 
Politics" (M.A thesis, University of Nebras-
ka, 1938); David Stephens Trask, "The Ne-
braska Populist Party: A Social and Political 
Analysis" (Ph.D. diss., vniversity of Nebraska, 
Lincoln, 1971); Samuel Emlen Walker, "Popu-
lism and Industrialism: The Ideology of the 
Official Organ of the Nebraska Populist Move-
ment" (M.A thesis, University of Nebraska 
at Omaha, 1970). 
15. Democratic Promise, note 8, p. 660. 
The section cited in Barnhart, "Farmers' Al-
liance," pp. 325-26, deals generally with the 
election results and does not include any of 
the errors. The section cited in Horace S. 
Merrill, Bourbon Democracy of the Middle 
West, 1865-1896 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1953), pp. 222-25, is 
another general account of the elections of 
1890 and 1892, but with none of the errors. 
Coletta's article on Bryan's second cOligres-
sional campaign indicates the extent to which 
Democrat Bryan sought to secure support 
from Populists and is equally clear that the 
Populists ran a candidate against him. 
16. Democratic Promise, note 47, p. 646; 
Douglas Bakken, ed., "Luna E. Kellie and the 
Farmers' Alliance," Nebraska History· 50 
(1969): 185-206. 
17. Democratic Promise, pp. 202, 262; 
Guth, "Kern," pp. 47, 60; Beal, "Custer Coun-
ty," pp. 22, 29, 31-32, 35,53-54. The index 
to Democratic Promise cites Kern as follows: 
"leads local level cooperative movement in 
Nebraska, 202-7," p. 711. 
18. Stanley B. Parsons, The Populist Con-
text: Rural versus Urban Power on a Great 
Plains Frontier (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1973), pp. 68-71; Barnhart, "Farmers' 
Alliance," pp. 37,100,139-46. 
19. Parsons, Populist Context, pp. 68-
71; Barnhart, "Farmers' Alliance," chapter 4, 
esp. pp. 200-2. 
20. For Kansas, see Raymond Curtis Miller, 
"The Populist Party in Kansas" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Chicago, 1928); Walter T. K. 
Nugent, The Tolerant Populists (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963); O. Gene 
Clanton, Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1969). 
For Nebraska, see the various sources already 
cited, especially Barnhart, Parsons, Olson, 
Trask, Luebke, Sheldon, and Watkins. For 
both, see John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: 
A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the 
People's Party (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1931), which remains, despite all 
claims to the contrary, the most complete and 
accurate account of the Alliance and the Popu-
list party. 
21. Lewis, ed., Party Platforms, pp. 97-
98, 104-6, 122-23, 127-28; Barnhart, "Farm-
ers' Alliance," chapter 3, esp. pp. 154 ff. 
22. Lewis, ed., Party Platforms, pp. 149-
50, 158-59, 163-66, 174-76, 183-84, 191-
93,201-2. 
23. Democratic Promise, pp. 234, 209; 
Parsons, Populist Context, pp. 132-41; Wat-
kins, History of Nebraska, 3:230-37, 247-
53; Sheldon, Nebraska, 1 :696-708, 725-28; 
Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 183-84, 281-84; 
Barnhart, "Farmers' Alliance," pp. 273-77, 
194 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1981 
343-50; Eric Monkkonen, "Can Nebraska or 
Any State Regulate Railroads: Smyth v. Ames, 
1898," Nebraska History 54 (1973): 365-82. 
24. Democratic Promise, p. 210; for ac-
counts of the social and educational aspects of 
the Alliance, see the various memoirs listed in 
note 14, esp. those by M. L. Jeffrey, A. F. 
Mullen, and J. H. Powers; see also Watkins, 
History of Nebraska, 3:229-30; Barnhart, 
"Farmers' Alliance," chapter 3; Parsons, Popu-
list Context, chapter 5; Elton A Perkey, "The 
First Farmers' Alliance in Nebraska," Nebraska 
History 57 (1976): 242-47. 
25. Karen Toombs, Beverly Burgers, Walter 
Killilae, and Stanley B. Parsons, "The Role of 
Co-operatives in the Development of the Move-
ment Culture of populism" (paper presented 
at the Mid-Continent History Conference, 
Springfield, Mo., September 21, 1978), esp. 
pp. 13, 20. 
26. Democratic Promise, pp. 314, 394, 
note 39 on pp. 651-53. Goodwyn's presenta-
tion of statistical materials is sometimes embar-
rassingly weak. The most glaring example is on 
page 29, where Goodwyn characterizes a de-
cline in credit from $916.63 to $400 as "a 
drop of well over 100 percent in [the farmer's 1 
standard of living." This is actually a decline 
of 56 percent in the value of items charged with 
the furnishing merchant, which mayor may not 
reflect accurately the farmer's standard ofliving, 
depending on the amount of food, fuel and other 
necessities the farmer produced himself. An-
other example may be found on page 13, where 
the wheat farmer's situation is so simplified 
that the example becomes totally meaningless. 
27. Democratic Promise, pp. 5-10, notes 
1 and 8, pp. 615-17; there is no careful consid-
eration of the work of Paul Kleppner (The 
Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Mid-
western Politics, 1850-1900, New York: Free 
Press, 1970), indeed, no consideration what-
ever beyond a "see also" footnote. The cen-
trally important work of Samuel P. Hays is 
completely ignored, including his "Political 
Parties and the Community-Society Con-
tinuum," in The American Party Systems: 
Stages of Political Development, edited by 
William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean 
Burnham, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1975). Although published since 
Goodwyn's book appeared, Kleppner's 111e 
Third Electoral System, 1853-1892: Parties, 
Voters, and Political Cultures (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979) 
is a detailed exposition of voting behavior in 
the period that indicates the inadequacy of 
Goodwyn's eight "constituencies." See also 
Luebke, Immigrants and Politics, and Richard 
J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social 
and Political Conflict, 1888-1896 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
28. Democratic Promise, p. ii. A recent 
article suggests that Goodwyn's treatment 
of Texas Populism may have overemphasized 
the role of cooperatives. See James Turner, 
"Understanding the Populists," Journal of 
American History 67 (1980): 354-73. 
